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THE LARGE SPACE OF INFORMATION STRUCTURES
FABIEN GENSBITTEL, MARCIN PESKI, AND JE´ROˆME RENAULT
Abstract. We revisit the question of modeling incomplete information among 2 Bayesian
players, following an ex-ante approach based on values of zero-sum games. K being the finite
set of possible parameters, an information structure is defined as a probability distribution
u with finite support over K × N × N with the interpretation that: u is publicly known
by the players, (k, c, d) is selected according to u, then c (resp. d) is announced to player
1 (resp. player 2). Given a payoff structure g, composed of matrix games indexed by the
state, the value of the incomplete information game defined by u and g is denoted val(u, g).
We evaluate the pseudo-distance d(u, v) between 2 information structures u and v by the
supremum of |val(u, g) − val(v, g)| for all g with payoffs in [−1, 1], and study the metric
space Z∗ of equivalent information structures.
We first provide a tractable characterization of d(u, v), as the minimal distance between
2 polytopes, and recover the characterization of Peski (2008) for u  v, generalizing to
2 players Blackwell’s comparison of experiments via garblings. We then show that Z∗,
endowed with a weak distance dW , is homeomorphic to the set of consistent probabilities
with finite support over the universal belief space of Mertens and Zamir. Finally we show
the existence of a sequence of information structures, where players acquire more and more
information, and of ε > 0 such that any two elements of the sequence have distance at least
ε : having more and more information may lead nowhere. As a consequence, the completion
of (Z∗, d) is not compact, hence not homeomorphic to the set of consistent probabilities
over the states of the world a` la Mertens and Zamir. This example answers by the negative
the second (and last unsolved) of the three problems posed by J.F. Mertens in his paper
“Repeated Games”, ICM 1986.
1. Introduction
Given a countable set S, we denote by ∆(S) = {x = (x(s))s∈S ∈ R
S
+,
∑
s∈S x(s) = 1} the
set of probability distributions over S, and by ∆f(S) the set set of probability distributions
with finite support over S. The Dirac measure on an element s will be denoted δs. More
generally if S is a compact metric space, ∆(S) is the set of Borel probability distributions
on S, and is endowed with the weak topology.
F. Gensbittel and J. Renault : Toulouse School of Economics, University Toulouse
Capitole.
M. Peski : Department of Economics, University of Toronto.
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2. The Space of Information Structures
Throughout the paper, K is a fixed finite set of parameters or states of nature, e.g.
K = {0, 1} or K = {Blue, Red}. There is a true state k in K, which is imperfectly known
by two Bayesian players. The general question is : What is the set of possible situations ?
Definition 1. An information structure is a probability with finite support over K ×N×N.
The set of information structures is denoted by U = ∆f(K × N× N).
The interpretation of an information structure u is the following : u is publicly known by
the players, a triple (k, c, d) is selected according to u, then the state is k, player 1 learns c
and player 2 learns d. So an information structure represents an ex-ante situation, before
the players have received their signals.
Unless otherwise specified, in our examples K will have two elements and u will be uniform
over a finite subset of K × N× N.
Example 1. K = {Blue, Red}, and u is represented by:
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
t
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
2
0
1
Here with probability 1/4, the top blue edge is selected, which means that the state is blue,
player 1 receives the signal 0 and player 2 receives the signal 0. With probability 1/4, the
top red edge is selected : the state is red, player 1 receives the signal 0 and player 2 receives
the signal 1. Etc...
After receiving signal 0, player 1 believes that both states in K are equally likely. It is the
same after receiving signal 1. However the two signals of player 1 convey distinct information
for him: after receiving signal 0, player 1 knows that if the state is blue then player 2 knows
it, whereas after receiving signal 1, player 1 knows that if the state is blue then player 2 has
a uniform belief on K.
The central idea is to evaluate an information structure via the values of associated zero-
sum Bayesian games. We first define payoff structures, which are given by a matrix game
with payoff in [−1, 1] for each state in K. Since we don’t want to fix a priori the size of the
matrices, we will formally consider infinite matrices with only finitely many relevant rows
and columns.
Definition 2. Given L ≥ 1, a payoff structure of size L is a map g : K × N× N→ [−1, 1],
such that for all (k, i, j): g(k, i, j) = −1 if i ≥ L > j and g(k, i, j) = 1 if j ≥ L > i.
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The set of payoff structures of size L is denoted by G(L), and the set of payoff structures is
G =
⋃
L≥1 G(L).
Example 2. K = {Blue, Red}. To represent a payoff structure g of size 2, it is enough to
give a blue and a red matrix such as
{(
0 0
−3
5
1
)
,
(
1 −3
5
0 0
)}
.
Definition 3. An information structure u and a payoff structure g together define a zero-
sum Bayesian game Γ(u, g) played as follows: First, (k, c, d) is selected according to u, player
1 learns c and player 2 learns d. Then simultaneously player 1 chooses i in N and player 2
chooses j in N, and finally the payoff of player 1 is g(k, i, j). Γ(u, g) can be seen as a finite
zero-sum game, and we denote its value by val(u, g).
Example 3. Consider the payoff structure g of example 2.
1) The information structure is u1, where players have complete information on the state:
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
0
1
Here the unique optimal strategies are, for player 2, to play the left column after signal 0
and to play the right column after signal 1 and, for player 1 to play the top row after signal
0 and the bottom row after signal 1. val(u1, g) = 0.
2) The information structure is u2, with lack of information on the side of player 2 :
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
0
1
Here the unique optimal strategy for player 1 is to play bottom after 0 and top after 1,
whereas any strategy of player 2 which plays after signal 0 both left and right with prob-
ability at least 3/8 is optimal. And val(u2, g) = 1/5. Comparing with u1, we recover that
optimal strategies of player 1 do not only depend on his belief on K.
3) Here the information structure u3 is given by :
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✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
2
3
4
2
3
1
0
Here val(u3, g) = 1/10, and the unique optimal strategy of player 1 is to play top after
signals 0 and 2, and bottom after signal 1 and 3. Note that player 1 should play very
differently after receiving signal 1 and 2, whereas in both cases : player 1 believes that both
states on K are equally likely, player 1 believes that player 2 believes that both states are
equally likely, and player 1 believes that player 2 believes that player 1 believes that both
states are equally likely.
Given u, v in U , a natural distance between u and v is given by the L1-norm:
‖u− v‖ =
∑
k∈K,(c,d)∈N2
|u(k, c, d)− v(k, c, d)|.
If g is a payoff structure in G, since all payoffs are in [−1, 1] it is easy to see that |val(u, g)−
val(v, g)| ≤ ‖u− v‖.
We now order and compare information structures.
Definition 4. Given u, v in U , say that u  v if for all g in G, val(u, g) ≥ val(v, g).
Definition 5. Given u, v in U , define :
d(u, v) = sup
g∈G
|val(u, g)− val(v, g)|.
Clearly d(u, v) ≤ ‖u − v‖ ≤ 2. d(u, v) = d(v, u) ∈ [0, 1] and d satisfies the triangular
inequality but we may have d(u, v) = 0 for u 6= v, so d is a pseudo-distance on U . Similarly
 is reflexive and transitive but one may have u  v and v  u for u 6= v. If we start from
an information structure u and relabel the signals of the players, we obtain an information
structure u′ which is formally different from u, but “equivalent” to u.
Definition 6. Say that u and v are equivalent, and write u ∼ v, if for all game structures
g in G, val(u, g) = val(v, g). We let U∗ = U/ ∼ be the set of equivalence classes.
d and  are naturally defined on U∗, and by construction d is a distance and  is a partial
order on U∗. We will study the metric d, and focus on three main questions:
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1) How to compute d(u, v) ?
2) What it the link between U∗ and the Mertens-Zamir space ?
3) How large is the space of information structures ? Given ε > 0, can we cover U∗ with
finitely many balls of radius ε ?
Whereas previous papers in the literature restrict attention1 to a particular subset of U
(independent information, lack of information on one side, fixed support...), we will study
the general case of information structures in U and U∗.
3. Computing d(u, v)
We give here a tractable characterization of d(u, v), based on duality between signals and
actions. We start with the notion of garbling, used by Blackwell to compare statistical
experiments [1].
Definition 7. A garbling is an element q : N → ∆f (N), and the set of all garblings is
denoted by Q. Given a garbling g in Q and an information structure u in U , we define the
information structures q.u and u.q in U by: ∀k ∈ K, ∀c, c′, d, d′ ∈ N,
q.u(k, c′, d) =
∑
c∈N
u(k, c, d)q(c)(c′) and q.u(k, c, d′) =
∑
d∈N
u(k, c, d)q(d)(d′).
The interpretation of q.u is as follows: first (k, c, d) is selected according to u, the state is
k and player 2 learns d. c′ is selected according to the probability q(c), and player 1 learns c′.
Here, the signal received by player 1 has been deteriorated through the garbling q. And u.q
corresponds to the dual situation where the signal of player 2 has been deteriorated. Since
in a zero-sum game the value is monotonic in the information of the players, regardless of
the payoffs player 1 always weakly prefers u to q.u, and u.q to u :
Lemma 1. For all u in U and q in Q, q.u  u  u.q
To compute d(u, v), we will use here a second and new interpretation. A garbling q in Q
will also be seen as a behavior strategy of a player in a Bayesian game Γ(u, g): if the signal
received is c, play the mixed action q(c).
Notations: Given L ≥ 1, we denote by U(L) the set of information structures u with
support in K×{0, ..., L−1}2 : only the first L signals of each player matter. We also denote
by Q(L) the set of garblings q : N→ ∆f (N), with range in ∆({0, ..., L− 1}).
1For instance, one can read in [2] “We leave open the question of what happens when the components of
the state on which the players have some information fail to be independent.... In this situation the notion
of monotonicity is unclear, and the duality method is not well understood.”
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U(L) is a convex compact subset of a finite dimensional vector space. Notice that for u
in U and L ≥ 1, the sets Q(L).u = {q.u, q ∈ Q(L)} and u.Q(L) = {u.q, q ∈ Q(L)} are also
convex compacta in Euclidean spaces.
Consider now u and v in U . Since u and v have finite support, we can find L such that
both u and v are in U(L). Our first theorem shows that supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) can be
simply computed as the minimal distance, measured by the norm ‖.‖, between the convex
compact subsets Q(L).u and v.Q(L) of U(L). Moreover, the supremum is achieved by a
payoff structure of size L.
Theorem 1. For u, v in U(L),
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = max
g∈G(L)
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ,
= min
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
‖q1.u− v.q2‖,
= min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
Since d(u, v) = max{supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) , supg∈G(val(u, g)− val(v, g))}, the fol-
lowing corollary is immediate, and explains how to compute d(u, v).
Corollary 1. For u, v in U ,
d(u, v) = max
g∈G
|val(u, g)− val(v, g)| = max
{
min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖, min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖u.q1 − q2.v‖
}
.
We can also recover from theorem 1 that : u  v ⇐⇒ ∃q1, q2 ∈ Q, q1.u = v.q2, as obtained
by Peski [9], generalizing the Blackwell characterization of more informative experiment to
the multi-player setting. And we get a simple characterization of the equivalence relation:
u ∼ v ⇐⇒ ∃q1, q2, q3, q4 ∈ Q, q1.u = v.q2, u.q3 = q4.v.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on two main aspects : the two interpretations of a garbling
(deterioration of signals, and strategy), and the use of a minmax theorem due to the fact
that we consider information structures with finitely many signals.
Proof of Theorem 1.
1) We start with general considerations. For u in U and g ∈ G, we denote by γu,g(q1, q2)
the payoff of player 1 in the zero-sum game Γ(u, g) when player 1 plays q1 ∈ Q and
player 2 plays q2 ∈ Q. Extending as usual g to mixed actions, we have: γu,g(q1, q2) =∑
k,c,d u(k, c, d)g(k, q1(c), q2(d)). Notice that in Γ(u, g), both players can play the identity
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strategy Id in Q which plays with probability one the signal received. And for u in U
and g in G, the scalar product 〈g, u〉 =
∑
k∈K,(c,d)∈N2 g(k, c, d)u(k, c, d) is well defined, and
corresponds to the expectation of g with respect to u, and to the payoff γu,g(Id, Id).
Let us now compute the payoff γu,g(q1, q2), for any q1 and q2 in Q :
γu,g(q1, q2) =
∑
k,c,d
u(k, c, d)g(k, q1(c), q2(d))
=
∑
k,c,d
u(k, c, d)
∑
(c′,d′)∈N2
q1(c)(c
′)q2(d)(d
′)g(k, c′, d′)
=
∑
k,c′,d′
g(k, c′, d′)
∑
c,d
u(k, c, d)q1(c)(c
′)q2(d)(d
′)
=
∑
k,c′,d′
g(k, c′, d′) q1.u.q2(k, c
′, d′)
= 〈g, q1.u.q2〉.
Consequently, val(u, g) = maxq1∈Qminq2∈Q〈g, q1.u.q2〉 = minq2∈Qmaxq1∈Q〈g, q1.u.q2〉. Since
both players can play the Id strategy in Γu,g, we obtain for all u ∈ U(L) and g ∈ G(L) :
inf
q2∈Q
〈g, u.q2〉 ≤ inf
q2∈Q(L)
〈g, u.q2〉 ≤ val(u, g) ≤ sup
q1∈Q(L)
〈g, q1.u〉 ≤ sup
q1∈Q
〈g, q1.u〉.
Notice also that for all u, v in U , ‖u− v‖ = supg∈G〈g, u− v〉.
2) We now prove Theorem 1.
Consider g in G, q1 and q2 in Q. val(v.q2, g) ≥ val(v, g) and val(u, g) ≥ val(q1.u, g), so:
val(v, g)− val(u, g) ≤ val(v.q2, g)− val(q1.u, g) ≤ ‖q1.u− v.q2‖. We first obtain:
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≤ inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
Clearly, supg∈G(L) (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≤ supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) and infq1∈Q,q2∈Q ‖q1.u−
v.q2‖ ≤ infq1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L) ‖q1.u− v.q2‖. So it will be enough to prove that
inf
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
‖q1.u− v.q2‖ ≤ sup
g∈G(L)
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) . (3.1)
We have infq1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L) ‖q1.u− v.q2‖ = infq1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L) supg∈G(L)〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉. The sets
Q(L) and G(L) are compact, and by Sion’s theorem :
inf
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
sup
g∈G(L)
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉 = sup
g∈G(L)
inf
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉.
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Inequality (3.1) now follows from :
sup
g∈G(L)
inf
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉 = sup
g∈G(L)
(
inf
q2∈Q(L)
〈g, v.q2〉 − sup
q1∈Q(L)
〈g, q1.u〉
)
≤ sup
g∈G(L)
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) .
Finally notice that the compactness of Q(L) and G(L) also give that the above infima and
suprema are achieved.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 and its proof also imply the followings.
1) For u, v in U(L), the sets A = {q1.u− v.q2, q1 ∈ Q, q2 ∈ Q} and B = {q1.v − u.q2, q1 ∈
Q, q2 ∈ Q} are polytopes in R
K×{0,...,L−1}2, and to compute d(u, v) it is enough to compute
α = Min{‖x‖1, x ∈ A} and β = Min{‖x‖1, x ∈ B}. Then d(u, v) = max{α, β}.
2) Relationship between d, ‖.‖ and : We have for all u, v in U ,
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = min
u′u,v′v
‖u′ − v′‖.
3) Optimal payoff structure : If u, v are in U(L), supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) is achieved
for g ∈ G(L) maximizing minq1,q2∈Q(L)〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉. This shows how to find g such that
d(u, v) = |val(u, g)− val(v, g)|.
4) Optimal strategies : Consider u, v in U(L), and let q1 and q2 achieving the minimum
in minq′1∈Q(L),q′2∈Q(L) ‖q
′
1.u − v.q
′
2‖. We have ‖q1.u − v.q2‖ = supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≤
d(u, v). Let g be a payoff structure in G, there is a canonical way to transform optimal
strategies in the Bayesian game Γ(v, g) into 2d(u, v)-optimal strategies in Γ(u, g). Indeed let
σ in Q be optimal for player 1 in Γ(v, g), and define σ.q1 in Q by σ.q1(c) =
∑
c′ q1(c)(c
′)σ(c′)
for each signal c : player 1 receives signal c, then selects c′ according to q1(c) and plays σ(c
′).
Using the notations of the proof of theorem 1, we have for every strategy τ of player 2 in Q:
γu,g(σ.q1, τ) = 〈g, (σ.q1).u.τ〉
= 〈g, σ.(q1.u).τ〉
≥ 〈g, σ.(v.q2).τ〉 − ‖q1.u− v.q2‖
≥ 〈g, σ.v.(τ.q2)〉 − d(u, v)
≥ val(v, g)− d(u, v)
≥ val(u, g)− 2d(u, v),
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so σ.q1 is 2d(u, v) optimal in Γ(u, g). Similarly if τ is optimal for player 2 in Γ(u, g), then
τ.q2 is 2d(u, v) optimal for player 2 in Γ(v, g).
Example 4. Consider for instance the following information structure u4.
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
t
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
2
0
1
u4
How valuable is u4 to player 1, in which sense it is profitable for player 1 ? What are
d(u2, u4) and d(u
′
2, u4) ?
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
0
1
u2
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
u′2
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
0
1
We first have ‖u2 − u4‖ = 1, so d(u2, u4) ≤ 1. We have u2  u4, hence d(u2, u4) =
minq1∈Q,q2∈Q ‖q1.u4 − u2.q2‖. Define q1 in Q such that q10) = δ0, q1(1) = q1(2) = δ1, and q2
in Q satisfying q2(0) = 1/2 δ0 + 1/2 δ1. The information structures q1.u4 and u2.q2 can be
represented as follows:
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
q1.u4
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
0
1 ✏✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
✏
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
u2.q2
t
t
t
t
P1 P2
0
1
0
1
Notice that u2.q2 ∼ u2, whereas q1.u4  u4. ‖q1.u4 − u2.q2‖ = 1/2, hence d(u2, u4) ≤ 1/2.
Consider now the payoff structure g given by
{(
0 1
0 −1
)
,
(
−1 0
1 0
)}
. In the game
(u2, g), it is optimal for player 1 to play Top if 0 and Bottom if 1, and val(u1, g) = 1/2. In
the game (u4, g) it is optimal for player 2 to play Left if 0 and Right if 1, and val(u4, g) = 0.
Consequently, d(u2, u4) ≥ 1/2, and we obtain d(u2, u4) = 1/2.
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Notice that u′2 ∼ u
′′
2, with u
′′
2 obtained from u2 by exchanging the signals 0 and 1 for each
player, and ‖u4−u
′′
2‖ = 1. Considering the payoff structure given by
{(
−1 1
−1 1
)
,
(
1 −1
1 −1
)}
gives d(u′2, u4) = 1, so u4 is closer to u2 than to u
′
2.
Example 5. Maximal distance with a given marginal on K. Consider p = (pk)k∈K in ∆(K).
max{d(u, v),marg
∆(K)
(u) = marg
∆(K)
(v) = p} = 2 (1−max
k
pk).
Proof : Assume w.l.o.g. that p1 = maxk pk. Define umax and umin in U such that
umax(k, c, d) = pk1c=k1d=0 (complete information for player 1, trivial information for player
2) and umin(k, c, d) = pk1c=01d=k for all (k, c, d) (trivial information for player 1, complete
information for player 2). Since the value of a zero-sum game is weakly increasing with player
1’s information and weakly decreasing with player 2’s information, we have umin  u  umax
and umin  v  umax. It implies that d(u, v) ≤ ‖umax − umin‖ = 2(1− p1).
Define now the payoff structure g such that g(k, c, d) = 1k=c−1k 6=c. Clearly, val(umax, g) =
1. In the game Γ(umin, g), it is optimal for player 1 to play c = 0, and val(umin, g) = p1−(1−
p1) = 2p1 − 1. Hence val(umax, g)− val(umin, g) = 2(1− p1), and d(umax, umin) = 2(1− p1).
Example 6. An example of convergence in the metric space (U∗, d) :
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
P1 P2
0
1
...
n
n+ 1
...
...
1
0
un
−−−→
n→∞
u
☛
✡
✟
✠
☛
✡
✟
✠
s s
P1 P2
0 0
The idea is that when n is large, with high probability the players will receive signals far
from 0 and n. These signals convey very little information to the players and only differ for
very high-order beliefs. Optimal strategies of Bayesian games may differ after receiving one
signal or another (as for u3 in Example 3), but if we restrict attention to the values of the
Bayesian games, un is close to the trivial information structure u.
We now prove the convergence. Consider garblings q1, q2, such that q1(0) is uniform
on {0, ..., n}, and q2(c) = δ0 for each c. Then q1.u = un.q2. We obtain u  un, and
d(u, un) = minq′1,q′2∈Q ‖q
′
1.un − u.q
′
2‖. Consider now q
′
1 = q2 and q
′
2 such that q
′
2(0) is uniform
on {0, ..., n+ 1}. We get ‖q′1.un − unq
′
2‖ ≤ 1/(n+ 1) −−−→
n→∞
0.
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Remark 2. Decision problems. Our approach can also be used for 1-player games or decision
problems, with U0 = ∆f (K × N), G0 = {g : K × N→ [−1, 1], ∃L s.t.∀i ≥ L, g(k, i) = −1},
and d0(u, v) = supg∈CG0 |val(v, g) − val(u, g)|. We obtain for u, v in U0, that d0(u, v) =
max{minq∈Q ‖q.u−v‖,minq∈Q ‖q.v−u‖} and the Blackwell characterization : u  v ⇔ ∃q ∈
Q, q.u = v.
Notice that what matters here for an information structure u in U0 is the induced law u˜
of the a posteriori of the player after receiving his signal. We also have, if D is the set of
suprema of affine functions from ∆(K) to [−1, 1] and E1 is the set of 1-Lipchitz functions
on ∆(K) : d0(u, v) = supf∈D
∣∣∣∫p∈∆(K) f(p)du˜(p)− ∫p∈∆(K) f(p)dv˜(p)∣∣∣,
and un −−−→
n→∞
u ⇐⇒ ∀f ∈ E1,
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)dun(p) −−−→
n→∞
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)du(p)
⇐⇒
(
sup
f∈E1
(∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)dun(p)−
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)du(p)
)
−−−→
n→∞
0
)
4. Links with the universal belief space
In the standard approach (Harsanyi, Mertens-Zamir), a situation of incomplete informa-
tion is described by a state of the world. A state of the world specifies the true state k, the
belief of each player on k, the belief of each player on the belief of each player on k, etc...
The set of states of the world is the universal belief space :
Ω = K ×Θ1 ×Θ2,
where for i = 1, 2, Θi is the universal type space of player i, containing all the coherent
belief hierarchies of this player. The type space of a player is always endowed with the weak
topology, and a crucial property is that Θi is compact and homeomorphic to the set of Borel
probabilities over K ×Θ−i.
Any information structure in U naturally induces a Borel probability distribution over
the universal belief space, which is consistent since we have a common prior and beliefs are
derived by Bayes’s rule. We denote by Π the set of consistent (Borel) probabilities over
the universal belief space, and by Πf the set of elements of Π with finite support. We
use the weak topology on Π and Πf , the space Π is then compact and Πf is dense in Π
(see corollary III.2.3 and theorem III.3.1 in [7]). All elements of Πf are induced by some
information structure in U , since given P in Πf we can associate an information structure u
in U selecting (k, θ1, θ2) according to P (formally, (k, f1(θ1), f2(θ2)) in K × N × N, with f1
and f2 being one-to-one).
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Given P in Πf and g in G, we can define val(P, g) as the value of the zero-sum Bayesian
game where first: (k, θ1, θ2) is selected according to P , then the players simultaneously se-
lect i and j in N, and the payoff to player 1 is g(k, i, j). By Proposition III.4.4 in [7],
val(u, g) = val(Φ(u), g) and an optimal strategy in the game defined by P and g induces an
optimal strategy in the zero-sum game Γ(u, g). Now, it is known that the value functions
of finite games separate the elements of Π (lemma 41 in Gossner Mertens [4]), so equivalent
information structures in U induce the same element of Πf , and we can associate to each
equivalence class in U∗ an element of Πf . We obtain a natural bijection from U
∗ to Πf , that
we denote by Φ, and one can ask how similar the topological spaces U∗ and Πf are.
In this section only, we will not consider the distance d, but the weak topology of pointwise
convergence on U and U∗.
Definition 8. A sequence of information structures (un)n≥1 weakly converges to u if for all
payoff structures g in G, val(un, g) −−−→
n→∞
val(u, g).
Since the set of payoff structures can be seen as a countable union of sets of payoff matrices
of a given size, one can find a sequence g1,...,gn,... of elements of G such that for each g in G
and ε > 0, there exists n with maxk∈K,(i,j)∈N2 |g(k, i, j)− gn(k, i, j)| ≤ ε. The sequence (gn)
is dense in G for the sup norm, and the weak convergence is metrizable by the metric:
dW (u, v) =
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
|val(u, gn)− val(v, gn) |.
(U∗, dW ) is now another metric space, a priori different from (U
∗, d) since we have changed
the metric. It can not be compact, since we have only considered information structures
with finite support.
Theorem 2.
1) The metric space (U∗, dW ) is homeomorphic to the space Πf of consistent probabilities
with finite support over the universal belief space.
2) Its completion is homeomorphic to the compact space Π of consistent probabilities over
the universal belief space.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Define, for P and Q in Π,
d∗W (P,Q) =
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
|val(P, gn)− val(Q, gn)| .
If for each n, val(P, gn)− val(Q, gn) = 0 then for all g in G, val(P, gn)− val(Q, gn) = 0, and
P = Q by lemma 41 of [4] again. d∗W is a metric on Π.
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For each payoff structure g, the mapping (P 7→ val(P, g)) is continuous for the weak
topology on Π (see Lemma 2 in [6] or Proposition III.4.3. in [7]). So if a sequence (Pt)t of
elements of Π weakly converges to some limit P , we have d∗W (Pt, P ) −−−→
t→∞
0.
Conversely, consider a sequence (Pt)t of elements of Π converging for d
∗ to some limit
P , we have for all n : val(Pt, gn) −−−→
t→∞
val(P, gn). For any converging subsequence (Pφt)t,
for the weak topology, with limit Q, we have by the previous paragraph, that for all n,
val(Pφt , gn) −−−→
t→∞
val(Q, gn). So d
∗
W (P,Q) = 0 for each limit point Q, and since Π is compact
the sequence (Pt)t converges to P .
We obtain that d∗W induces the weak topology on Π. By construction, the bijection Φ is
isometric from (U∗, dW ) to (Πf , d
∗
W ), hence an homeomorphism.
Finally, the completion of (U∗, dW ) is homeomorphic to the completion of (Πf , d
∗
W ). Since
d∗W induces the weak topology on Π, the completion of (Πf , d
∗
W ) is the closure of Πf . Since
Π is compact and Πf is dense in Π, this completion is Π.
Theorem 2 suggests a possible alternative construction of the set Π of consistent proba-
bility over the universal belief space. The alternative construction is simply based on the
values of finite zero-sum Bayesian games.
In the remainder of the paper we come back to the distance d on U∗.
5. How large is the space of information structures ?
We consider the metric space (U∗, d) (or simply U∗). As U only contains information
structures with finite support, U∗ can not be compact, and we denote by U its completion.
We focus here on a major property : is U compact ? Equivalently, is U∗ totally bounded,
i.e. given ε > 0 can we cover U∗ with finitely many balls of radius ε ? Can we see U∗ as a
subset of a compact metric space ?
One can show that this question is equivalent to any of the following ones:
A) Is U homeomorphic to the set Π of consistent probabilities over the universal belief
space ?
B) Are the distances d and the weak distance dW uniformly equivalent on U
∗?
C) Is the family (P 7→ val(P, g))g∈CG an equicontinous family of mappings from Π to R ?
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Question C) corresponds to the second of the three problems2 posed by J.F. Mertens in
his Repeated Games survey from ICM 1986 [6] : “This equicontinuity or Lispchitz property
character is crucial in many papers...”.
Remark 3. Repeated Games. Consider a general zero-sum repeated game (stochastic game,
with incomplete information and signals), given by a transition q : K×I×J −→ ∆(K×C×
D), a payoff function g : K×I×J −→ [−1, 1] and an initial probability u0 in ∆(K×A×B),
where K, I, J , A and B are finite subsets of N. Before stage 1, an initial state k1 in K and
initial private signals a1 in A for player 1, and b1 in B for player 2, are selected according
to u0. Then at each stage t, simultaneously player 1 chooses an action it in I and player 2
chooses and action j−t in J , and : the stage payoff is g(kt, it, jt), an element (kt+1, at+1, bt+1)
is selected according to g(kt, it, jt), the new state is kt+1, player 1 receives the signal at+1,
player 2 the signal bt+1, and the play proceeds to stage t+ 1.
An appropriate state variable is here u in U , representing the current state in K and the
finite sequence of signals previously received by each player. As a consequence, a recursive
formula can be explicitly written as follows: for all discount λ in (0, 1] and all u in U ,
vλ(u) = max
q1∈Q
min
q2∈Q
λG(u, q1, q2) + (1− λ)vλ(F (u, q1, q2)),
= min
q2∈Q
max
q1∈Q
λG(u, q1, q2) + (1− λ)vλ(F (u, q1, q2)),
with G(u, q1, q2) =
∑
k,c,d u(k, c, d)g(k, q1(c), q2(d)) ∈ [−1, 1], and F (u, q1, q2) ∈ U is de-
fined, for all (k, i, a, j, b) in K × I × A × J × B, by F (u, q1, q2)(k
′, f1(c, i, a), f2(d, j, b)) =∑
k u(k, c, d)q1(c)(i)q2(d)(j)q(k, i, j)(k
′, a, b) (where f1 and f2 are fixed one-to-one mappings
from N3 to N).
The value function vλ can be approximated by the value functions of finite games. Since
such value functions are, by construction, 1-Lipschitz from (U , d) to [−1, 1], so is vλ. Hence
the family (vλ)λ is equicontinuous, and if it happens that the set of information structures
that can be reached during the game is totally bounded, by Ascoli’s theorem this family has
a uniform limit point when λ→ 0.
Compactness of U is then strongly related to the equivalence between the strong distance
d and the weak distance dW . Notice that in the 1-player case of Remark 2, weak and strong
convergence are equivalent, and U0 is homeomorphic to ∆f(∆(K)), which is dense in the
2Problem 1 asked for the convergence of the value functions (vλ)λ and (vn)n in a general zero-sum repeated
game with finitely many states, actions and signals, and was disproved during the PhD thesis of B. Ziliotto
[11]. Problem 3 asks if the existence of a uniform value follows from the uniform convergence of (vλ), and
was disproved by Lehrer and Monderer [5] for 1-player games, see also [8].
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compact set ∆(∆(K)). For 2 players, compactness has been obtained in every particular
case tackled so far. If U ′ is a subset of U∗, we denote by U ′ the closure of U ′ in U :
• Set U1 of information structures where both players receive the same signal: U1 is
compact, and homeomorphic to ∆(∆(K)). Here given u in U1, what matters is the induced
law u˜ on the common a posteriori of the players on K. Another characterization of d(u, v)
has been obtained in [10]. let D1 be the subset of 1-Lipschitz functions from ∆(K) to R
satisfying ∀p, q ∈ ∆(K), ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(p)− bf(q) ≤ ‖ap− bq‖1. We have :
∀u, v ∈ U1, d(u, v) = sup
f∈D1
(∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)du˜(p)−
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)dv˜(p)
)
.
• Set U2 of information structures where player 1 knows the signal of player 2: U2 is
compact, and homeomorphic to ∆(∆(∆(K))) (see [6], [3]).
• Set U3 of independent information structures : U3 is the set of u in U such that
u(c, d|k) = u(c|k)u(d|k) (the signals c and d are conditionally independent given k). Here
U3 is homeomorphic to ∆(∆(K)×∆(L)).
We now present our main counterexample, where it is assumed that there are at least 2
states in K.
Theorem 3. There exists ε > 0 and a sequence (µl)l≥1 of information structures in U
satisfying :
1) d(µl, µp) > ε for all l 6= p,
2) for each l the conditional law of µl+1 on the support of µl is µl, and
3) for all l > p, the distribution on states and 2p-order beliefs induced by µl does not
depend on l.
Remarks :
Condition 1) implies that (U∗, d) is not totally bounded, and U is not compact. The space
of information structures U∗ is very large, in the sense that it is not a subset of a compact
metric space, one cannot approximate the space with finite sets. All questions A), B), C)
above have a negative answer, in particular U is not homeomorphic to Π.
Condition 2) means that to go from µl to µl+1, each player gets an extra signal. So having
more and more information may lead... nowhere. This has to be contrasted with the 1-
player case, where the sequence of beliefs of a player receiving more and more signals is a
martingale, which converges in law. We don’t have a “strategic martingale” convergence
theorem here.
Condition 3) implies there exists no n such that knowing the joint distribution of n-order
beliefs is enough to determine, up to ε, the value of every finite game with payoffs in [−1, 1].
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Computing the largest ε such that a sequence satisfying condition 1) exists seems very
difficult, but we believe it is very small. Rough estimates of our proof only gives ε ≥ 3.10−17.
6. Proof of theorem 3.
Without loss of generality we assume that there are two states: K = {0, 1}. For con-
venience we will consider information structures u in ∆(K × C × D) where C and D are
arbitrary finite sets (which can be easily identified with subsets of N). Similarly, we will
consider game structures g : K × C × D → [−1, 1], where C and D are the respective finite
sets of actions of player 1 and player 2.
N is a very large even integer to be fixed later, and we write A = C = D = {1, ..., N},
with the idea of using C while speaking of actions or signals of player 1, and using D while
speaking of actions and signals of player 2. We fix ε and α, to be used later, such that
0 < ε <
1
10(N + 1)2
, and α =
1
25
.
We will consider a Markov chain with law ν on A, satisfying:
• the law of the first state of the Markov chain is uniform on A,
• for each a in A, there are exactly N/2 elements b in A such that ν(b|a) = 2/N : given
that the current state of the Markov chain is a, the law of the next state is uniform on a
subset of states of size N/2,
• and two more conditions, called UI1 and UI2, to be be defined later.
A sequence (a1, ..., al) of length l ≥ 1 is said to be nice it it is in the support of the Markov
chain: ν(a1, ..., al) > 0. For instance any sequence of length 1 is nice, and N
2/2 sequences of
length 2 are nice. The proof is now split in 3 parts: we first define the information structures
(ul)l≥1 and some payoff structures (g
p)p≥1. Then we define the conditions UI1 and UI2 and
show that they imply the conclusions of theorem 3. Finally, we show, via the probabilistic
method, the existence of a Markov chain ν satisfying all our conditions.
6.1. Information and payoff structures (ul)l≥1 and (g
p)p≥1.
Definition 9. For l ≥ 1, define the information structure ul ∈ ∆(K × C l × Dl) by: for
each state k in K, signal c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l of player 1 and signal d = (d1, ..., dl) in D
l for
player 2,
ul(k, c, d) = ν(c1, d1, c2, d2, ..., cl, dl)
(
c1
N + 1
1k=1 +
1− c1
N + 1
1k=0
)
.
The following interpretation of ul holds: first select (a1, a2, ..., a2l) = (c1, d1, ..., cl, dl) in A
2l
according to the Markov chain ν (i.e. uniformly among the nice sequences of length 2l), then
tell (c1, c2, ..., cl) (the elements of the sequence with odd indices) to player 1, and (d1, d2, ..., dl)
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(the elements of the sequence with even indices) to player 2. Finally choose the state k = 1
with probability c1/(N+1), and state k = 0 with the complement probability 1−c1/(N+1).
Notice that the definition is not symmetric among players, the first signal c1 of player 1 is
uniformly distributed and plays a particular role. The marginal of ul on K is uniform, and
the marginal of ul+1 over (K × C l × V l) holds : condition 2 ) of theorem 3 is satisfied.
We now show that condition 3 ) of the theorem holds. Recall that n-order beliefs are
defined inductively as conditional laws. Precisely, the first order beliefs θi1 of player i is the
conditional law of k given her signal. The n-order belief θin of player i is the conditional
law of (ω, θ−in−1) given her signal. In this construction, conditional laws are seen as random
variables taking values in space of probability measures.
Lemma 2. For all l > p, the joint distribution of (ω, θ12p, θ
2
2p) induced by the information
structure ul is independent of l.
Proof. We use the notation L(X|Y ) for the conditional law of X given Y , and the identifi-
cation (a1, ..., a2l) = (c1, d1, ...., cl, dl). At first, note that by construction k and (a2, ...., a2l)
are conditionally independent given a1, so that the sequence (k, a1, a2, ..., a2l) is a Markov
process. It follows that θ11 = L(k|c1, ..., cl) =L(k|c1). The Markov property implies that
θ21 = L(k|d1, ...., dl) = L(k|d1), θ
2
2 = L(d, θ
1
1(c1)|d1, ...., dl) = L(k, θ
1
1(c1)|d1),
and therefore we have
θ12 = L(k, θ
2
1(d1)|c1, ...., cl) = L(k, θ
2
1(d1)|c1, c2).
By induction, and applying the same argument (future and past of a Markov process are
conditionally independent given the current position), we deduce that for all n ≥ 1,
θ12n = L(k, θ
2
2n−1|c1, ...., cmin(l,n+1)), θ
1
2n+1 = L(k, θ
2
2n|c1, ...., cmin(l,n+1)),
θ22n−1 = L(k, θ
1
2n−2|d1, ...., dmin(l,n)), θ
2
2n = L(k, θ
1
2n−1|d1, ...., dmin(l,n)).
As a consequence, for all n ≤ p, these conditional laws do not depend on which ul we are
using as soon as l > p. 
Let us give already a very rough intuition of the conditions UI1 and UI2 and the Bayesian
games that we will consider. The players will be asked to report their signals, and payoffs will
highly depend on whether the reported sequence is nice or not. And, thanks to the conditions
UI1 and UI2, the chain will be such that if (c1, d1, ..., cl, dl) is selected according to ν and
player 2 only knows (d1, ..., dl), any deviation of player 2 to some (d1, ..., dr−1, dr, ..., d
′
l), with
d′r 6= dr, will satisfy:
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ν ((c1, d1, ..., cr, d
′
r) is nice) ≃ 1/2,
ν ((c1, d1, ..., cr, d
′
r, cr+1) is nice) ≃ 1/4,
ν
(
(c1, d1, ..., cr, d
′
r, cr+1, d
′
r+1) is nice
)
≃ 1/8,
etc..., and similar conditions for deviations of player 1.
Definition 10. Consider a sequence (a1, ..., al) of elements of A which is not nice, i.e.
such that ν(a1, ..., al) = 0. We say that the sequence is not nice because of player 1 if
min{t ∈ {1, ..., l}, ν(a1, ..., at) = 0} is odd, and not nice because of player 2 if min{t ∈
{1, ..., l}, ν(a1, ..., at) = 0} is even.
A sequence (a1, ..., al) is now either nice, or not nice because of player 1, or not nice because
of player 2. A sequence of length 2 is either nice, or not nice because of player 2.
Definition 11. For p ≥ 1, define the payoff structure gp : K × Cp × Dp−1 → [−1, 1] such
that for all k in K, c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
p) in C
p, d′ = (d′1, ..., d
′
p−1) in D
p−1 :
gp(k, c′, d′) = g0(k, c
′
1) + h
p(c′, d′), with
g0(k, c
′
1) = −
(
k −
u′1
N + 1
)2
+
N + 2
6(N + 1)
,
hp(c′, d′) =

ε if (c′1, d
′
1, ..., c
′
p) is nice,
5ε if (c′1, d
′
1, ..., c
′
p) is not nice because of player 2,
−5ε if (c′1, d
′
1, ..., c
′
p) is not nice because of player 1.
One can check that |gp| ≤ 5/6+ 5ε ≤ 8/9. Regarding the g0 part of the payoff, consider a
decision problem for player 1 where: c1 is selected uniformly in A and the state is selected
to be k = 1 with probability c1/(N + 1) and k = 0 with probability 1 − c1/(N + 1).
Player 1 observes c1 but not k, and he choose c
′
1 in A and receive payoff g0(k, c
′
1). We have
c1
N+1
g0(1, c
′
1)+(1−
c1
N+1
)g0(0, c
′
1) =
1
(N+1)2
(c′1(2c1−c
′
1)+(N+1)((N+2)/6−c1)). To maximize
this expected payoff, it is well known that player 1 should play his belief on k, i.e. c′1 = c1.
Moreover, if player 1 chooses c′1 6= c1, its expected loss from not having chosen c1 is at least
1
(N+1)2
≥ 10ε. And the constant N+2
6(N+1)
has been chosen such that the value of this decision
problem is 0.
Consider now l ≥ 1 and p ≥ 1. By definition, the Bayesian game Γ(uk, gp) is played as
follows: first, (c1, d1, ..., cl, dl) is selected according to the law ν of the Markov chain, player 1
learns (c1, ..., cl), player 2 learns (d1, ..., dl) and the state is k = 1 with probability c1/(N +1)
and k = 0 otherwise. Then simultaneously player 1 chooses c′ in Cp and player 2 chooses d′ in
Dp−1, and finally the payoff to player 1 is gp(k, c′, d′). Notice that by the previous paragraph
about g0, it is always strictly dominant for player 1 to report correctly his first signal, i.e. to
choose c′1 = c1. We will show in the next section that if l ≥ p and player 1 simply plays the
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sequence of signals he received, player 2 can not do better than also reporting truthfully his
own signals, leading to a value not lower than the payoff for nice sequences, that is ε. On the
contrary in the game Γ(ul, gl+1), player 1 has to report not only the l signals he has received,
but also an extra-signal c′l+1 that he has to guess. In this game we will prove that if player
2 truthfully reports his own signals, player 1 will incur the payoff −5ε with probability at
least (approximately) 1/2, and this will result in a low value. These intuitions will prove
correct in the next section, under some conditions UI1 and UI2.
6.2. Conditions UI and values. To prove that the intuitions of the previous paragraph
are correct, we need to ensure that players have incentives to report their true signals, so we
need additional assumptions on the Markov chain.
Notations and definition: Let l ≥ 1, m ≥ 0, c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l and d = (d1, ..., dm) in
Dm. We write :
a2q(c, d) = (c1, d1, ...., cq, dq) ∈ A
2q for each q ≤ min{l, m},
a2q+1(c, d) = (c1, d1, ...., cq, dq, cq+1) ∈ A
2q+1 for each q ≤ min{l − 1, m}.
For r ≤ min{2l, 2m+ 1},
we say that c and d are nice at level r, and we write c ⌣r d, if a
r(c, d) is nice.
In the next definition we consider an information structure ul ∈ ∆(K × C l × Dl) and
denote by c˜ and d˜ the respective random variables of the signals of player 1 and 2.
Definition 12.
We say that the conditions UI1 are satisfied if for all l ≥ 1, all c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l and
c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
l+1) in C
l+1 such that c1 = c
′
1, we have
ul
(
c′ ⌣2l+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α] (6.1)
and for all m ∈ {1, ..., l} such that cm 6= c
′
m, for r = 2m− 2, 2m− 1,
ul
(
c′ ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣r d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α]. (6.2)
We say that the conditions UI2 are satisfied if for all 1 ≤ p ≤ l, for all d ∈ Dl, for all
d′ ∈ Dp−1, for all m ∈ {1, ..., p− 1} such that dm 6= d
′
m, for r = 2m− 1, 2m
ul
(
c˜ ⌣r+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣r d
′
)
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α]. (6.3)
To understand the conditions UI1, consider the Bayesian game Γ(ul, gl+1), and assume
that player 2 truthfully reports his sequence of signals and that player 1 has received the
signals (c1, ..., cl) in C
l. (6.1) states that if the sequence of reported signals (c′1, d˜1, ..., c
′
l, d˜l)
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is nice at level 2l, then whatever the last reported signal c′l+1, the conditional probabil-
ity that (c′1, d˜1, ..., c
′
l, d˜l, c
′
l+1) is still nice is in [1/2 − α, 1/2 + α], i.e. close to 1/2. Re-
garding (6.2), first notice that if c′ = c, then by construction (c′1, d˜1, ..., c
′
l, d˜l) is nice and
ul
(
c′ ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣r d˜) = ul (c ⌣r+1 d˜ ∣∣ c˜ = c) = 1 for each r = 1, ..., 2l− 1. Assume
now that for some m = 1, ..., l, player 1 misreports his mth-signal, i.e. reports c′m 6= cm.
(6.2) requires that given that the reported signals were nice so far (at level 2m − 2), the
conditional probability that the reported signals are not nice at level 2m−1 (integrating c′m)
is close to 1/2, and moreover if the reported signals are nice at this level 2m− 1, adding the
next signal d˜m of player 2 has probability close to 1/2 to keep the reported sequence nice.
Conditions UI2 have a similar interpretation, considering the Bayesian games Γ(ul, gp) for
p ≤ l, assuming that player 1 reports truthfully his signals and that player 2 plays d′ after
having received the signals d.
Proposition 1. Conditions UI1 and UI2 imply :
∀l ≥ 1, ∀p ∈ {1, ..., l}, val(ul, gp) ≥ ε. (6.4)
∀l ≥ 1, val(ul, gl+1) ≤ −ε. (6.5)
As a consequence of this proposition, under conditions UI1 and UI2 we easily obtain
condition 1) of theorem 3 :
Corollary 2. If l 6= p then d(ul, up) ≥ 2ε.
Proof. Assume l > p, then d(ul, up) ≥ val(ul, gp+1)− val(up, gp+1) ≥ ε− (−ε).
Proof of proposition 1. We assume that UI1 and UI2 hold. We fix l ≥ 1, work on the
probability space K × C l ×Dl equipped with the probability ul, and denote by c˜ and d˜ the
random variables of the signals received by the players.
1) We first prove (6.4), and consider the game Γ(ul, gp) with p ∈ {1, ..., l}. We assume
that player 1 chooses the truthful strategy. Fix d = (d1, ..., dl) in D
l and d′ = (d′1, ..., d
′
p−1)
in Dp−1, and assume that player 2 has received the signal d and chooses to report d′.
Define the non-increasing sequence of events:
An = {c˜ ⌣n d
′}.
We will prove by backward induction that:
∀n = 1, ..., p, E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d, A2n−1] ≥ ε. (6.6)
If n = p, hp(c˜, d′) = ε on the event A2p−1, implying the result. Assume now that for some n
such that 1 ≤ n < p, we have : E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d, A2n+1] ≥ ε. Since we have a non-increasing
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sequence of events, 1A2n−1 = 1A2n+1+1A2n−11Ac2n+1A2n1Ac2n+1 , so by definition of the payoffs,
hp(c˜, d′)1A2n−1 = h
p(c˜, d′)1A2n+1 + 5ε1A2n−11Ac2n − 5ε1A2n1Ac2n+1 .
First assume that d′n = dn. By construction of the Markov chain, u
l(A2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ =
d) = 1, implying that ul(Ac2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d) = u
l(Ac2n|A2n−1, d˜ = d) = 0. As a consequence,
E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d, A2n−1] = E[h
p(c˜, d′)1A2n+1|d˜ = d, A2n−1]
= E[E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d, A2n+1]1A2n+1|d˜ = d, A2n−1]
≥ ε.
Assume now that d′n 6= dn. Assumption UI2 implies that :
ul(Ac2n|A2n−1, d˜ = d) ≥ 1/2− α,
ul(A2n ∩A
c
2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d) ≤ (1/2 + α)
2,
ul(A2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d) ≥ (1/2− α)
2.
It follows that :
E[hp(c˜, d′|d˜) = d, A2n−1] = E[E[h
p(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d, A2n+1]1A2n+1 |d˜ = d, A2n−1]
+ 5εul(Ac2n|A2n−1, d˜ = d)− 5εu
l(A2n ∩A
c
2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d)
≥ ε (
1
4
− α+ α2) + 5 ε (
1
2
− α)− 5 ε (
1
4
+ α+ α2)
= ε (
3
2
− 11α− 4α2) ≥ ε,
And (6.6) follows by backward induction.
Since A1 is an event which holds almost surely, we deduce that E[h
p(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d] ≥ ε.
Hence the truthful strategy of player 1 guarantees the payoff ε in Γ(ul, gp).
2) We now prove (6.5) and consider the Bayesian game Γ(ul, gl+1), assuming that player
2 chooses the truthful strategy. Fix c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l and c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
l−1) in C
l−1, and
assume that player 1 has received the signal c and chooses to report c′. We will show that
the expected payoff of player 1 is not larger than −ε, and assume w.l.o.g. that c′1 = c1.
Consider the non-increasing sequence of events :
Bn = {c
′ ⌣n d˜ }.
We will prove by backward induction that:
∀n = 1, ..., l, E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n] ≤ −ε.
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If n = l, we have 1B2l = 1B2l+1 + 1B2l1Bc2l+1, and h
l+1(c′, d˜)1B2l = ε1B2l+1 − 5ε1B2l1Bc2l+1 .
UI1 implies that |ul(B2l+1|c˜ = c, B2l)−
1
2
| ≤ α , and it follows that :
E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2l] = ε u
l(B2l+1|c˜ = c, B2l)− 5ε u
l(Bc2l+1|u = uˆ, B2l)
≤ ε (
1
2
+ α)− 5ε (
1
2
− α) ≤ −ε.
Assume now that for some n = 1, ..., l − 1, we have E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n+2] ≤ −ε. We
have 1B2n = 1B2n+2 + 1B2n1Bc2n+1 + 1B2n+11Bc2n+2 , and by definition of h
l+1,
hl+1(c′, d˜)1B2n = h
l+1(c′, d˜)1B2n+2 − 5ε1B2n1Bc2n+1 + 5ε1B2n+11Bc2n+2 .
First assume that c′n+1 = cn+1, then u
l(B2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c) = 1. Then :
E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n] = E[h
l+1(c′, d˜)1B2n+2|c˜ = c, B2n],
= E[E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n+2]1B2n+2 |c˜ = c, B2n] ≤ −ε.
Assume on the contrary that c′n+1 6= cn+1, assumption UI1 implies that :
ul(Bc2n+1|B2n, c˜ = c) ≥ 1/2− α,
ul(B2n+1 ∩ B
c
2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c) ≤ (1/2 + α)
2,
ul(B2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c) ≥ (1/2− α)
2.
It follows that :
E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n] = E[E[h
l+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n+2]1B2n+2 |c˜ = c, B2n]
− 5 ε ul(Bc2n+1|B2n, c˜ = c) + 5 ε u
l(B2n+1 ∩B
c
2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c)
≤ − ε (
1
4
− α + α2)− 5 ε (
1
2
− α) + 5 ε (
1
4
+ α + α2) ≤ −ε.
By induction, we obtain E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2] ≤ −ε. Since B2 holds almost surely here,
we get E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c] ≤ −ε, showing that the truthful strategy of player 2 guarantees
that the payoff of the maximizer is less or equal to −ε, and concluding the proof.
6.3. Existence of an appropriate Markov chain. Here we conclude the proof of The-
orem 3 by showing the existence of an even integer N and a Markov chain with law ν on
A = {1, ..., N} satisfying our conditions :
1) the law of the first state of the Markov chain is uniform on A,
2) for each a in A, there are exactly N/2 elements b in A such that ν(b|a) = 2/N ,
3) UI1 and UI2.
Denoting by P = (Pa,b)(a,b)∈A2 the transition matrix of the Markov chain, we have to prove
the existence of P satisfying 2) and 3). The proof is non constructive and uses the following
probabilistic method, where we select independently for each a in A, the set {b ∈ A, Pa,b > 0}
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uniformly among the subsets of A with cardinal N/2. We will show that when N goes to
infinity, the probability of selecting an appropriate transition matrix does not only become
positive, but converges to 1.
Formally, denote by SA the collection of all subsets S ⊆ A with cardinality |S| =
1
2
N . We
consider a collection (Sa)a∈A of i.i.d. random variables uniform distributed over SA defined
on a probability space (ΩN ,FN ,PN). For all a, b in A, let
Xa,b = 1{b∈Sa} and Pa,b =
2
N
Xa,b.
By construction, P is a transition matrix satisfying 2). Theorem 3 will now follow directly
from the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
PN ( P induces a Markov chain satisfying UI1 and UI2 ) −−−→
n→∞
1.
In particular, the above probability is strictly positive for all sufficiently large N .
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of proposition 2.
We start with probability bounds based on Hoeffding’s inequality.
Lemma 3. For any a 6= b, each γ > 0
PN
(∣∣∣∣|Sa ∩ Sb| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN) ≤ 12e4Ne−2γ2N .
Proof. Consider a family of i.i.d. Bernoulli variables (X˜i,j)i=a,b, j∈A of parameter
1
2
defined on
a space (Ω,F ,P). For i = a, b, define the events L˜i = {
∑
j∈A X˜i,j =
N
2
} and the set-valued
variables S˜i = {j ∈ A | X˜i,j = 1}. It is straightforward to check that the conditional law of
(S˜a, S˜b) given L˜a ∩ L˜b under P is the same as the law of (Sa, Sb) under PN . It follows that
PN
(∣∣∣∣|Sa ∩ Sb| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN) = P(∣∣∣∣|S˜a ∩ S˜b| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN ∣∣∣ L˜a ∩ L˜b)
≤
P
(∣∣∣|S˜a ∩ S˜b| − 14N∣∣∣ ≥ γN)
P
(
L˜a ∩ L˜b
) .
Using Hoeffding inequality, we have
P
(∣∣∣∣|S˜a ∩ S˜b| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN) = P
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
j∈A
X˜a,jX˜b,j −
1
4
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e−2γ
2N .
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On the other hand, using Stirling approximation3, we have
P
(
L˜a ∩ L˜b
)
=
(
1
2N
N !(
N
2
!
)2
)2
≥
(
2N+1N−
1
2
2Ne2
)2
=
4
Ne4
.
We deduce that PN
(∣∣|Sa ∩ Sb| − 14N∣∣ ≥ γN) ≤ 12e4Ne−2γ2N . 
Lemma 4. For each a 6= b, for any subset S ⊆ A and any γ ≥ 1
2N−2
,
PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi,a −
1
2
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e−2Nγ
2
, and PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi,aXi,b −
1
4
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e−
1
2
Nγ2 .
Proof. For the first inequality, notice that Xi,a are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with
parameter 1
2
. The Hoeffding inequality implies that :
PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi,a −
1
2
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e
−2γ2 N
2
|S| ≤ 2e−2Nγ
2
.
For the second inequality, let Zi = Xi,aXi,b. Notice that all variables Zi are i.i.d. Bernoulli
random variables with parameter p = 1
2
(
N
2
−1
N−1
)
= 1
4
− 1
4N−4
. The Hoeffding inequality implies
that
PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Zi −
1
4
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Zi − p |S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12γN
)
≤ 2e−2γ
2 N
2
|S| ≤ 2e−
1
2
Nγ2 ,
where we used that |S||p− 1
4
| ≤ N
4N−4
≤ γN
2
for the first inequality. 
Definition 13. For each a 6= b and c 6= d, each γ > 0, define :
Ya = 2
∑
i∈AXi,a, Y
c = 2
∑
i∈AXc,i = N ,
Ya,b = 4
∑
i∈AXi,aXi,b, Y
c
a = 4
∑
i∈AXi,aXc,i, Y
c,d = 4
∑
i∈AXc,iXd,i,
Y ca,b = 8
∑
i∈AXi,aXi,bXc,i, Y
c,d
a = 8
∑
i∈AXi,aXc,iXd,i, Y
c,d
a,b = 16
∑
i∈AXi,aXi,bXc,iXd,i.
Lemma 5. For each a 6= b and c 6= d, each γ ≥ 64/N, each of the variables Z ∈
{Ya, Y
c, Ya,b, Y
c,d, Y ca , Y
c
a,b, Y
c,d
a , Y
c,d
a,b },
PN (|Z −N | ≥ γN) ≤ e
4Ne−
N
32
( γ
10
)2 .
3We have nn+
1
2 e−n ≤ n! ≤ enn+
1
2 e−n for each n.
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Proof. In case Z = Ya or Ya,b, the bound follows from Lemma 4 (for S = A). If case Z = Y
c,
the bound is trivially satisfied. If Z = Y c,d, the bound follows from Lemma 3.
In case Z = Y c,da,b , notice that
Y c,da,b = 16
∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Zi, where Zi = Xi,aXi,b.
All variables Zi are i.i.d. Bernouilli random variables with parameter p =
1
4
− 1
4N−4
. Moreover,
{Zi}i 6=c,d are independent of Sc ∩ Sd. Up to enlarge the probability space, we can construct
a new collection of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables Z ′i such that Z
′
i = Zi for all i 6= c, d and
such that {(Z ′i)i∈A, Sc ∩ Sd} are all independent. Then,∣∣∣∣∣Y c,da,b − 16 ∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Z ′i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 32,
and, because 1
2
γN ≥ 32, we have
PN
(∣∣∣Y c,da,b −N∣∣∣ ≥ γN) ≤ PN
(∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Z ′i −
1
16
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 132γN
)
.
Define the events
A =
{∣∣∣∣14 |Sc ∩ Sd| − N16
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1160γN
}
, B =
{∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Z ′i −
1
4
|Sc ∩ Sd|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 140γN
}
.
Then, the probability can be further bounded by
≤ PN (A) + PN (B) ≤
1
2
e4Ne−2N(
1
40
γ)
2
+ 2e−
1
2
N( 140γ)
2
≤ e4Ne−
Nγ2
3200
where the first bound comes from Lemma 3, and the second from the second bound in Lemma
4.
The remaining bounds have proofs similar (and simpler) to the case Z = Y c,da,b . 
Finally, we describe an event E that collects these bounds. Recall that α = 1/25, and
define for each a 6= b and c 6= d,
Ea,b,c,d =
{∣∣∣∣Ya,bYa − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩ {∣∣∣∣Y ca,bY ca − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩{∣∣∣∣Y c,daY ca − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩
{∣∣∣∣∣Y
c,d
a,b
Y c,da
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α
}
{∣∣∣∣Y c,dY c − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩ {∣∣∣∣Y caY c − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩{∣∣∣∣Y c,daY c,d − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} .
Finally, let
E =
⋂
a,b,c,d:a6=b and c 6=d
Ea,b,c,d.
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Lemma 6. We have
PN(E) > 1− 7e
4N5e−
N
2163200 −−−→
n→∞
1.
Proof. Take γ = α
1+α
= 1
26
and let
Fa,b,c,d =
⋂
Z∈{Ya,Ya,b,Y c,d,Y c,d,Y ca ,Y
c
a,b
,Y
c,d
a ,Y
c,d
a,b
}
{|Z −N | ≤ γN} .
It is easy to see that Fa,b,c,d ⊆ Ea,b,c,d. The probability that Fa,b,c,d holds can be bounded
from Lemma 5 (as soon as N ≥ 64
γ
= 1664), as
PN (Fa,b,c,d) ≥ 1− 7e
4Ne
− N
32.(260)2 .
The result follows since there are less than N4 ways of choosing (a, b, c, d). 
Computations using the bound of lemma 6 show that N = 52.106 is enough to have the
existence of an appropriate Markov chain. So one can take ε = 3.10−17 in the statement
of theorem 3. We conclude the proof of proposition 2 by showing that event E implies
conditions UI1 and UI2.
Lemma 7. If event E holds, then the conditions UI1, UI2 are satisfied.
Proof. We fix the law ν of the Markov chain on A and assume that it has been induced, as
explained at the beginning of section 6.3, by a transition matrix P satisfying E. For l ≥ 1,
we forget about the state in K and still denote by ul the marginal of ul over C l × Dl. If
c = (c1, ..., cl) ∈ C
l and d = (d1, ..., dl) ∈ D
l, we have ul(c, d) = ν(c1, d1, ..., cl, dl).
Let us begin with condition UI2 which we recall here: for all 1 ≤ p ≤ l, for all d ∈ Dl, for
all d′ ∈ Dp−1, for all m ∈ {1, ..., p− 1} such that dm 6= d
′
m, for r = 2m− 1, 2m,
ul
(
c˜ ⌣r+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣r d
′
)
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α], (6.3)
where (c˜, d˜) is a random variable selected according to ul. The quantity ul
(
c˜ ⌣r+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣r d
′
)
is thus the conditional probability of the event (c˜ and d′ are nice at level r + 1) given that
they are nice at level r and that the signal received by player 2 is d. We divide the problem
into different cases.
Case m > 1 and r = 2m− 1.
Note that the events {c˜ ⌣2m d
′} and {c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′} can be decomposed as follows :
{c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′} = {c˜ ⌣2m−2 d
′} ∩ {Xd′m−1,c˜m = 1},
{c˜ ⌣2m d
′} = {c˜ ⌣2m−2 d
′} ∩ {Xd′m−1,c˜m = 1} ∩ {Xc˜m,d′m = 1}.
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So ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′
)
= ul
(
Xc˜m,d′m = 1|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′
)
, and the Markov
property gives:
ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′
)
= ul
(
Xc˜m,d′m = 1|Xd′m−1,c˜m = 1, Xdm−1,c˜m = 1, Xc˜m,dm = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈U Xi,d′mXd′m−1,iXdm−1,iXi,dm∑
i∈U Xd′m−1,iXdm−1,iXi,dm
.
This is equal to 1
2
Y
dm−1,d
′
m−1
dm,d
′
m
Y
dm−1,d
′
m−1
dm
if d′m−1 6= dm−1, and to
1
2
Y
dm−1
dm,d
′
m
Y
dm−1
dm
if d′m−1 = dm−1. In both cases,
E implies (6.3).
Case r = 2m.
We have ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m d
′
)
= ul
(
Xd′m,c˜m+1 = 1|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m d
′
)
, and by the
Markov property :
ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m d
′
)
= ul
(
Xd′m,c˜m+1 = 1|Xdm,c˜m+1 = 1, Xc˜m+1,dm+1 = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈U Xd′m,iXdm,iXi,dm+1∑
i∈U Xdm,iXi,dm+1
=
1
2
Y
d′m,dm
dm+1
Y dmdm+1
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Case m = 1, r = 1.
ul
(
c˜ ⌣2 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣1 d
′
)
= ul
(
c˜ ⌣2 d
′|d˜ = d
)
,
= ul
(
Xc˜1,d′1 = 1|Xc˜1,d1 = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈U Xi,d′1Xi,d1∑
i∈U Xi,d1
=
1
2
Yd1,d′1
Yd1
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Let us now consider condition UI1: we require that for all l ≥ 1, all c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l
and c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
l+1) in C
l+1 such that c1 = c
′
1, we have
ul
(
c′ ⌣2l+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α] (6.1)
and for all m ∈ {1, ..., l} such that cm 6= c
′
m, for r = 2m− 2, 2m− 1,
ul
(
c′ ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣r d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α]. (6.2)
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We start with (6.1).
ul
(
c′ ⌣2l+1 d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2l d˜
)
= ul
(
Xd˜l,c′l+1
= 1|c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xd˜l,c′l+1
= 1|Xc
l
,d˜l
= 1, Xc′
l
,d˜l
= 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xi,c′l+1Xcl,iXc′l,i∑
i∈V Xcl,iXc′l,i
.
This is 1
2
Y
cl,c
′
l
cl+1
Y
cl,c
′
l
if c′l 6= cl, and
1
2
Y
cl
cl+1
Y cl
if c′l = cl. In both cases, (6.1) holds.
We finally consider (6.2) and distinguish several case.
Case r = 2m− 1 and m = l.
ul
(
c′ ⌣2l d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2l−1 d˜
)
= ul
(
Xc′
l
,d˜l
= 1|c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l−1 d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xc′
l
,d˜l
= 1|Xc
l
,d˜l
= 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xc′l,iXcl,i∑
i∈V Xcl,i
,
=
1
2
Y c
′
l
,c
l
Y cl
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Case r = 2m− 1 and m < l.
ul
(
c′ ⌣2m d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2m−1 d˜
)
= ul
(
Xc′m,d˜m = 1|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2m−1 d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xc′m,d˜m = 1|Xcm,d˜m = 1, Xd˜m,cm+1 = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xc′m,iXcm,iXi,cm+1∑
i∈V Xcm,iXi,cm+1
,
=
1
2
Y
c′m,cm
cm+1
Y cmcm+1
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Case r = 2m− 2.
ul
(
c′ ⌣2m−1 d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2m−2 d˜
)
= ul
(
Xd˜m−1,c′m = 1|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2m−1 d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xd˜m−1,c′m = 1|Xc′m−1,d˜m−1 = Xcm−1,d˜m−1 = Xd˜m−1,cm = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xi,c′mXi,cmXc′m−1,iXcm−1,i∑
i∈V Xi,cmXc′m−1,iXcm−1,i
.
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This is 1
2
Y
c′m−1,cm−1
c′m,cm
Y
c′
m−1
cm−1
cm
if cm−1 6= c
′
m−1, and
1
2
Y
cm−1
c′m,cm
Y
cm−1
cm
if cm−1 = c
′
m−1. In both cases, it belongs to
[1/2− α, 1/2 + α], concluding the proofs of lemma 7, proposition 2 and theorem 3. 
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